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To study climate change, scientists employ computer models, which approximate target systems with
various levels of skill. Given the imperfection of climate models, how do scientists use simulations to
generate knowledge about the causes of observed climate change? Addressing a similar question in the
context of biological modelling, Levins (1966) proposed an account grounded in robustness analysis.
Recent philosophical discussions dispute the conﬁrmatory power of robustness, raising the question of
how the results of computer modelling studies contribute to the body of evidence supporting hypotheses
about climate change. Expanding on Staley’s (2004) distinction between evidential strength and security,
and Lloyd’s (2015) argument connecting variety-of-evidence inferences and robustness analysis, I
address this question with respect to recent challenges to the epistemology robustness analysis. Applying
this epistemology to case studies of climate change, I argue that, despite imperfections in climate models,
and epistemic constraints on variety-of-evidence reasoning and robustness analysis, this framework
accounts for the strength and security of evidence supporting climatological inferences, including the
ﬁnding that global warming is occurring and its primary causes are anthropogenic.
 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science1. Introduction
The global climate system is large and complex, with many
causal factors interacting to produce all sorts of climatic phenom-
ena. To study climate change, scientists employ computer models,
which are imperfect representations of target systems. The most
detailed, high-resolution models omit representations of major
features of the planet that affect the climate (e.g., mountain ranges)
and contain parameterizations that simplify complex climatic
processes (e.g., cloud formation). Knowing whether a given climate
model provides insight into questions about a target system at
various scales and about its responses to different perturbations is,
therefore, often difﬁcult to determine.
Among the ﬁndings in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is theail.com.conclusion that “[i]t is extremely likely that human activities caused
more than half of the observed increase in global mean surface
temperature [GMST] from 1951 [to] 2010” (Bindoff et al., 2013, p.
869). Important sources of evidence for this conclusion are the
results of computer model simulations. Given that each of the
modelled worlds used to study the climate is substantially different
from the earth, how do scientists use computer simulations to
generate knowledge about the causes of observed climate change?
I address this question by employing a distinction between
evidential strength and security (Staley, 2004), and ideas of variety-
of-evidence reasoning and robustness analysis (Lloyd, 2015),
focussing on the epistemic advantages of drawing on a range of
observations, experiments and models, expanding upon related
philosophical enquiries into this ﬁeld of study (Edwards, 2010;
Katzav and Parker, 2015; Lloyd, 2009, 2010; Norton & Suppe,
2001; Oreskes, 2007; Parker, 2006, 2010; Weisberg, 2006).
Although other accounts also emphasize the importance of multi-
ple sources of data, further analysis of the relationship between
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the epistemology of current climate modelling research and
advance philosophical debates about the structure of reliable sci-
entiﬁc methodology. Applying this epistemology to case studies
documented by the IPCC, I argue that varieties-of-evidence
reasoning and robustness analysis account for the strength and
security of evidence supporting important climatological in-
ferences that make use of imperfect computer models.
The approach of the paper is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the
logic of variety-of-evidence inferences by describing a set of
evidential pathways that converge in support of the global warm-
ing hypothesis. This example presents a clear case of strong
evidential reasoning, which is a precursor to themore complex case
of addressing the role of computer model simulations in climate
change attribution studies. Section 3 explains how multiple
imperfect models contribute to the security of scientiﬁc knowledge
because multiple independent approximations of a target system
provide alternative evidential pathways to support particular hy-
potheses. I explain how model agreement in studies of anthropo-
genic climate change exemplify the conﬁrmatory roles of varieties-
of-evidence reasoning and robustness analysis and I address some
of Parker’s (2011) concerns about evidential security, while also
acknowledging important limitations of modelling methodology.
Section 4 concludes the paper by summarizing the main points of
the argument.2. Evidence of global warming
An evidential pathway is a collection of information that sup-
ports an inference. An evidence claim is a proposition stating that
some information is evidence for a hypothesis (H). Kent Staley
(2004) suggests that attaining multiple lines of evidence can in-
crease the plausibility of H by enhancing its evidential strength and
security.1 While he draws a distinction between evidential strength
(i.e., the degree towhich evidence indicatesH) and security (i.e., the
insensitivity of an evidence claim to changes in some evidential
pathway), he sets aside the question of how one can increases the
strength of an inference (p. 468). As suggested by the analysis of
Elisabeth Lloyd (2015), variety-of-evidence reasoning can, however,
account for the way in which multiple lines of evidence strengthen
an inference. According to this perspective, evidential strength is
attained when multiple independent evidential pathways indicate
H such that it would be unlikely that these various lines of evidence
would agree, if H were incorrect. In this context, it is not the
improbability of the individual lines of evidence occurring that
increases evidential strength but the improbability of their agree-
ment, if H were incorrect.
Variety-of-evidence reasoning is essentially the severe test cri-
terion advocated Mayo (1996), though Staley applies it somewhat
differently, as a constraint on appeals to robustness as “second
order evidence.”2 The question regarding this particular use of the
severity criterion as a measure of evidential strength is how exactly
its satisfaction is established. On the severity criterion, to show that
the convergence of different modelling results is improbable,
supposing H to be false requires considering the alternatives to H
and the probabilities those alternatives confer on the convergence
of evidence. This criterion is stronger than the formulation of
William Whewell’s “consilience of inductions” as the argument
that “[n]o accident could give rise to such an extraordinary1 Also see Staley (2011, 2012).
2 Staley also links this criterion to Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) criterion of
“discriminant validation.”
3 For related historical accounts, see Fleming (1998) and Weart (2011).coincidence” (Whewell, 1858, p. 88), which only establishes that H
has passed a severe test if an “accident” is the only alternative to H.
In the current context, alternative hypotheses to account for global
warming which have been established as improbable include the
claims that natural variability or other forcing mechanisms, such as
variations in solar input, volcanic activity, and orbital cycles, are the
main drivers of recent warming (Bindoff et al., 2013).
Climate science contains many examples of variety-of-evidence
reasoning, the case of global warming providing a vivid illustration.
The IPCC exempliﬁes this point in its evaluation of the Global
Warming hypothesis (GW)dthat is, the proposition that “Global
Mean Surface Temperature has increased since the late 19th cen-
tury” (Hartmann et al., 2013, p. 161). The evidence converging on
GW includes observations of different interconnected components
of the climate system, the collection of which would be unlikely to
occur if GW were incorrect. Land-surface weather stations provide
the most direct evidential pathway supporting GW, but other
climate indicators include measured changes in atmospheric and
oceanic temperatures at various heights and depths; in glacier
mass, snow coverage, and sea ice extent; in sea level; and in at-
mospheric water vapour content.
Fig. 1 contains 10 graphs depicting the consilience of evidence
supporting this hypothesis. Since the atmosphere and hydrosphere
are interconnected ﬂuid bodies, a warming at the earth’s surface
produces detectable effects at different levels of the atmosphere
and ocean. Some of the energy absorbed by the climate system is
stored in the oceans, and this energy uptake is detectable in global
ocean heat content records going back to the 1950s. Another line of
support is the change in the amount of water vapour in the at-
mosphere, i.e., its speciﬁc humidity, measurements of which show
a positive change both over the land and the oceans. Observed sea-
level rise is another line of support; warming oceans result inwater
expansion, leading to rising sea levels, which are further height-
ened by additional water input frommelting glaciers and ice sheets
and changes to the storage and usage of water on land. The cryo-
sphere (i.e., the frozen parts of the planet) is also affected by
changing temperatures. Snow cover, particularly during the spring,
is sensitive to temperature changes. Since the 1950s, Northern
Hemisphere spring snow cover has declined. Similarly, Arctic sea-
ice losses are detectable in satellite records, particularly at the
end of the annual melt in September, which is the time of its
minimum extent. For at least the last 20 years, the amount of ice
contained in glaciers globally has declined (Hartmann et al., 2013).
Since observations of these diverse phenomena are both
consistent with GW and would be improbable if GWwere incorrect,
these ﬁndings comprise a case of variety-of-evidence reasoning.
With the detection of GW thus well established, the next question
to consider is: What has been causing this warming?
3. Climate modelling, robustness analysis, and anthropogenic
global warming
While a diversity of evidence increases the strength of H by
drawing onmultiple sources of information, this mode of reasoning
is distinct from the idea of evidential robustness. The literature on
this subject distinguishes several notions of robust reasoning per-
taining to theorems, phenomena, modes of detection (Calcott,
2011; Levins, 1966, 1993; Orzack and Sober, 1993; Wimsatt,
2001), inferences, measurements, derivations, causal relationships
(Woodward, 2006), parameter values, mathematical structures,
representation frameworks (Weisberg & Reisman, 2008), computer
models and simulations (Houkes & Vaesen, 2012; Lloyd, 2015;
Muldoon, 2007; Parker, 2011). Although distinctions among these
ideas are philosophically interesting, for the purposes of this paper I
will focus on a general sense of robust evidential reasoning, which
Fig. 1. 1Multiple independent indicators of a changing global climate. Each line represents an independently derived estimate of change in the climate element. In each panel all
data sets have been normalized to a common period of record (Hartmann et al., 2013, p. 199) Cambridge University Press.
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ensuring that the inference is insensitive to inaccuracies of a
particular evidential pathway. The following case exempliﬁes how
converging evidential pathways provide Hwith evidential strength
and security, despite imperfections in particular lines of supporting
evidence.
One of the earliest formulations of the thesis that humans are
conducting a large scale ‘experiment’ on the global climate comes
from the work of Guy Stewart Callendar who, in 1938, read a paper
to the Royal Meteorological Society, arguing that CO2 from fossil
fuel consumption caused a measurable increase in the earth’s
temperature. “The course of world temperatures during the next
twenty years should,” he explained, “afford valuable evidence as to
the accuracy of the calculated [warming] effect of atmospheric
carbon dioxide” (Callendar, 1939, p. 236). Over a decade later,
Gilbert Plass echoed this idea, writing that, “[i]f at the end of this
century, measurements show that the carbon dioxide content of
the atmosphere has risen appreciably and at the same time the
temperature has continued to rise throughout the world, it will be
ﬁrmly established that carbon dioxide is an important factor in
causing climatic change” (Plass, 1956, p. 387). Perhaps the mostwell-known statement of this thesis is that of Roger Revelle and
Hans Suess:
[H]uman beings are now carrying out a large scale geophysical
experiment of a kind that could not have happened in the past
nor be reproduced in the future. Within a few centuries we are
returning to the atmosphere and oceans the concentrated
organic carbon stored in sedimentary rocks over hundreds of
millions of years. This experiment, if adequately documented,
may yield a far-reaching insight into the processes determining
weather and climate (Revelle & Suess, 1957, pp. 19e20).3
The logic of climate change detection and attribution (D&A)
studies involves a mode of induction that is more complex than
simply correlating increasing anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions with increasing GMST. While detecting climate change
involves a procedure of inferring that some climatic variable has
changed in a deﬁned statistical sense, attributing causal force to a
particular variable involves a procedure of determining the com-
ponents of a target system responsible for the detected change.
D&A analyses investigate aspects of the climate over different scales
Fig. 2. Observations are shown on each panel in black or black and shades of grey. Blue shading is the model time series for natural forcing simulations and pink shading is the
combined natural and anthropogenic forcings. The dark blue and dark red lines are the ensemble means from the model simulations” (Bindoff et al., 2013, p. 930) Cambridge
University Press. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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(from minutes to millennia), using various methods to study the
causes of climate change. Some focus on human activities that in-
ﬂuence climatic variables such as surface air temperature, tropo-
spheric temperature, depletion of stratospheric ozone, daily
temperature extremes, precipitation patterns, upper ocean tem-
peratures, glacier melting, ocean salinity, and ocean acidiﬁcation
and oxygen depletion.4
Attribution studies into the question of whether human activ-
ities are responsible for climate change employ computer model-
ling methods. An important modelling strategy is to examine
whether a detected change is consistent with simulations (made by4 For an overview of D&A studies investigating these and other variables, see
Bindoff et al. (2013, pp. 932e939).skillful models) that predict a given response to anthropogenic
forcing while being inconsistent with alternative (counterfactual)
simulations that exclude this forcing. Accordingly, this approach
has been applied to investigate the causes of GW (Fig. 2).
Although computer models and the simulations they produce
are critical in scientiﬁc studies about climate change, even the most
detailed, high-resolution models of the global climate omit
important representations of major features of the planet that
affect the climate and contain parameterizations that simplify
complex climatic processes (McGufﬁe and Henderson-Sellers,
2014). While certain forms of scientiﬁc representations have un-
ambiguous relations to reality, the extent of the representational
relationship between numerical models and reality can be ambig-
uous. Richard Levins (1966) explains this point by comparing nu-
merical models (in population biology) with traditional geographic
maps. Map legends stipulate clear relations between the object
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geographical space it depicts). Continuity of lines on a map corre-
spond to contiguity of physical features of reality; relative distances
on a map indicate relative distances in space; colours and symbols
indicate topographic features, and so on. Unlike a geographical
map, the representational limits of mathematical models are often
less clear. Whether a given climate model provides insight into
questions about a target system at various scales or about its re-
sponses to various perturbations can be difﬁcult to determine.
Roman Frigg, Smith, and Stainforth (2013, p. 893), for example,
maintain that systematic errors in models of the Climate Model
Intercomparison Project (CMIP) Phase 3 “lead to nontrivial
macroscopic errors of simulation,” such that errors in the GMST “in
a hindcast of the last century casts signiﬁcant doubt on the viability
of the informativeness assumption on a 25-km forecast to the end
of this century,” particularly the downscaled regional projections of
the 2009 United Kingdom Climate Projections (UKCP09) program.
Fig. 3 illustrates the differences among the 24 models of the CMIP3
in GMSTover the twentieth century. Whether errors in hindcasts of
GMST cast doubt on the plausibility of certain regional projections,
the spread of simulations and the difference between them and
observed GMST raises the question of whether such models can be
reliable for other purposes, such as that of attributing climate
change to human activities. Should model results qualify as evi-
dence of the causes of climate change even though they produce
such a wide range of hindcasts with respect to absolute GMST
change?What are the limits of how informative climatemodels can
be about the world?
On the one hand, as indicated in Fig. 3, simulation estimates of
absolute GMST change vary widely from one model to another, and
between models and the instrumental record, which may limit theFig. 3. Output of Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 3 models (24) simulating ch
lines) and instrumental measurements (black line) (Frigg et al., 2013) Philosophy of Scien
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)informativeness of down-scaling general circulation models
(GCMs) for some regional forecasts. In D&A studies, on the other
hand, rather than focussing on absolute GMST change or regional
projections, scientists typically concentrate on GMST anomalies
with respect to the mean over some baseline period, comparing
models programmed with natural and anthropogenic forcing to
those that contain natural forcing only (Fig. 2). A variety of models
that include anthropogenic forcing are better than those that
exclude it with respect to reproducing observed estimates of
climate change anomalies, which is a ﬁnding that constitutes evi-
dence of a human inﬂuence on the target system.
The strength of variety-of-evidence reasoning and the security
of robustness analysis are exempliﬁed by the use of computer
models in attribution studies supporting the anthropogenic global
warming hypothesis (AGW)dthat is, the proposition is that human
activities caused more than half of the observed increase in GMST
from 1951 to 2010 (Bindoff et al., 2013, p. 869). In testing AGW,
scientists model the climate in various ways, using models of
differing levels of complexity, including comparatively simple en-
ergy balance models, energy models of intermediate complexity,
GCMs, and earth systems models that contain coupled interacting
three-dimensional representations of different components of the
climate system, integrating models of the atmosphere, the oceans,
the carbon cycle, the cryosphere and the biosphere.
One can study these models and the simulations they produce
individually and in climate model ensembles. Scientists use a range
of methods to assess model-output, applying different statistical
analyses to identify relationships between dependent and inde-
pendent variables. The results of such modelling studies are also
supported by a variety of other evidence, including observations of
other changes in the atmosphere, the oceans and the cryosphereanges in annual global mean surface temperature over the twentieth century (coloured
ce Association. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the
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strong ﬁnding because multiple observations and modelling ap-
proaches of different components of the climate system are
consistent with AGW and would be improbable if AGW were
incorrect.
Given that each of the modelled worlds is very different from
each other and from the earth with respect to their levels of
complexity and the components of the climate represented, howdo
simulations inform scientists about the causes of global warming?
The answer to this question rests in the logic of robustness analysis.
In cases in which a set of various lines of evidence rely on very
rough approximations of a target, if different pieces of evidence,
such as those attained using different modelling methods, inde-
pendently point to the same conclusion, the evidential security of
the evidence indicating H can be maintained. By treating the same
problem with several alternative modelling methods, scientists
have established independent evidential pathways supporting
AGW such that, even though each climate model is an imperfect
representation of the target, each model is imperfect in a different
way. “Hence,” as Levins writes, “our truth is the intersection of
independent lies” (Levins, 1966, p. 423).
The convergence of multiple lines of evidence supporting AGW
exempliﬁes the way in which robustness analysis compensates for
the imperfections in models that constitute evidential pathways.
Gareth Jones, Stott, and Christidis (2013), for example, investigate
the causes of changes in near-surface temperatures from 1860 to
2010, utilizing the HadCRUT4 observational dataset and an
ensemble of 8 coupled models from CMIP5, ﬁnding that “calcula-
tions of attributable temperature trends based on optimal detection
support previous conclusions that the human-induced greenhouse
gases dominate observed global warming since the mid-20th
century” (p. 4001). Similarly, examining an ensemble of simula-
tions from an energy balance model of intermediate complexity
(Bern2.5D), Markus Huber and Reto Knutti (2012, P. 31) conclude
that “since the mid-twentieth century, greenhouse gases contrib-
uted 0.85 of warming, . suggesting an even higher conﬁdence
that human-induced causes dominate the observed warming.”
Further support for AGW emerges from studies of inter-
connected components of the climate that carry the signal of
anthropogenic activities. Jan Lavstovicka et al. (2006, p. 1253) ﬁnd
that “the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases inﬂuence
the atmosphere at nearly all altitudes,” including the upper atmo-
sphere, which has cooled and contractedda predicted result of
greenhouse warming. Comparing a dataset of observed ocean
temperatures with simulations from two climate models (PMC and
HadCM3), Tsuga Barnett et al. (2005) identify a signal of anthro-
pogenic forcing in the oceans: “A warming signal has penetrated
into the world’s oceans over the past 40 years. [The signal] cannot
be explained by natural internal climate variability or solar and
volcanic forcing, but is well simulated by two anthropogenically
forced climate models” (p. 284).
The evidential security that results from robustness analysis
contrasts with what William Wimsatt (1981) calls “serial chain”
reasoning. Serial reasoning involves drawing a conclusion by link-
ing premises in a sequence that is only as strong as its weakest link.
The problem with serial chain reasoning, both as a method of in-
duction and as a description of scientiﬁc practice, is that, when a
fault occurs in one line of evidence, any conclusion resting on it is
undermined. Since reliable inferences about the natural world rely
on many forms of inquiry, the fragile structure of serial reasoning is
incongruent with scientiﬁc methodology. In contrast, robustness
analysis involves connecting a conclusion to several independent
lines of evidence, providing multiple pillars of support, the collec-
tion of which results in the insensitivity of H to alterations in some
subset of the various evidential pathways.Robustness analysis accounts for the evidential security of AGW
because, even though imperfections exist in particular lines of ev-
idence, including variousmodellingmethods, alternative evidential
pathways provide independent lines supporting the plausibility of
this ﬁnding. Although each line of evidence contains imperfections,
as long as these lines of evidence are imperfect in different ways,
one line of imperfect evidence may compensate for the imperfec-
tions in another.
Examining several arguments for the epistemic signiﬁcance of
robustness arguments, Wendy Parker (2011) critiques the idea of
evidential security in relation to long-term predictions using
climate models, concluding that it cannot be inferred, via the ar-
guments she considers, that robust reasoning secures a claim to
have evidence for H. An evidence claim (E) is a claim about the
evidential status of some data as regards the plausibility of H.
Particularly important for the present analysis is her assessment of
Staley’s account, according to which the security of E is its degree of
susceptibility to defeat from the failure of an auxiliary assumption
of a given mode of inference (Staley, 2004, p. 468). Parker (2011, p.
596) presents the following generalized version of Staley’s
argument:
1. A modeling result rn enhances the security of an evidence claim
E if
a) E is derivable from rn in conjunction with a set of auxiliary
assumptions, An, and
b) E is derivable from each of modeling results r1 . rn1,
respectively, in conjunction with sets of auxiliary assumptions
A1. An1, respectively, and
c) An is partially logically independent of each of A1. An1.
2. 1ae1c are met in the present case.
r The security of E is enhanced.
According to this argument, even if one method for inferring E
turns out to involve a mistaken assumption (such as an over-
simpliﬁcation of a modelled process), the alternative assump-
tions involved in deriving other results provide “backup routes”
to E, thus securing the inference H. Parker raises two important
concerns with premises 1a and 1b. First, an individual climate
model result often provides at best weak evidence for H, and
only when multiple model results are taken together might they
collectively constitute strong evidence. According to the above
argument, however, the evidence for H would remain weak even
though multiple models produce agreeing results because the
claim that each model result supports is that there is weak evi-
dence for H. This objection underscores the challenge of
increasing the strength of an inference by appealing to the idea
of robustness. However, one can still explain the increasing
strength of evidential support for H in the case of climate
modelling studies by appealing to the variety-of-evidence
structure of reasoning described above (Section 2). That is to
say, while each model result taken on its own may provide only
weak positive support for H, since it would be unlikely that many
independent model results would even weakly support H unless
H were true, and such agreement does in fact occur, the multiple
results taken together provide stronger support than each result
taken alone. The attribution studies cited above comprise
different evidential pathways supporting AGW because the sets
of auxiliary assumptions in each study differ from one another in
various ways. These studies include models with different
structure, levels of complexity, components of the target system
represented, and corresponding physical principles and empirical
experiments. Even though each attribution study has its limita-
tions, the agreement among them provides a stronger case for
AGW than a given study on its own.
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model prediction has any positive evidential relevance is often
unclear because of such considerations as the uncertainties
regarding the roles of physical processes in the target system,
technological limitations on model construction and computing
power, the lack of opportunities to test model performance and,
when comparisons can be made between model results and ob-
servations of the target system, problems of interpreting the sig-
niﬁcance of a ﬁt between model and observed data. These
epistemic concerns are important for many areas of climatic
research, which scientists acknowledge as particularly salient in
developing long-range climate projections. However, rather than
being a general critique of the logic of robustness analysis, the
extent of the problem of overcoming or working within these
limitations depends on the context of each scientiﬁc investigation.
In the context of AGW, for example, enough is known about the
climate system to develop models for attribution studies. Scientists
compare model output with a wide range of observed data,
including those of paleoclimate reconstructions, which ground
modelled approximations of the causes of climate change in a
larger context of geophysical knowledge (IPCC, 2014).
4. Conclusion
This account elaborates on the logic of robustness epistemology
proposed by Levins to account for modelling methodology, incor-
porating the concepts of variety-of-evidence reasoning, and
evidential strength and security, in an analysis of case studies of
climate change. It borrows the ideas of evidential strength and
security posited by Staley and applies them to climate studies that
use computer modelling. Associating these ideas with varieties-of-
evidence inferences and robustness analysis, this account expands
on Lloyd’s discussion of these topics, addressing the question of
how climate scientists generate knowledge with the use of com-
puter models, given the extent to which models approximate re-
ality. Finally, it engages with some of Parker’s concerns about the
logic of robustness arguments, acknowledging the constraints on
climatemodelling methodology but defending this epistemological
framework as a way to account for the success of important
climatological inferences.
Studies of climate change have provided strong and secure
support for GW and AGW. In these cases, the independence of
different lines of evidence is due to different types of methodology,
observations, models and datasets that scientists incorporate in
their studies. The convergent lines of evidence supporting GW
include a wide range of observations, such as measurements of
changing surface atmospheric and oceanic temperatures, glaciers
mass, snow cover, sea ice, sea level and atmospheric water vapour.
Investigating the causes of climate change, scientists test AGW by
using multiple computer modelling methods in conjunction with a
variety of other lines of evidence, including observations of many
components of the climate system. These various lines of evidence
comprise strong support for AGW because they would be unlikely
to agree if AGW were incorrect. Notwithstanding uncertainties in
developing each line of evidence in climate modelling studies and
despite differences between the actual climate system and com-
puter model representations of it, models provide important
sources of information when model results are robust to variations
in the way they approximate the climate.
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